The paper seeks to measure the internal fiscal capacity or the potential to create 'space' in the seventeen non-special category States of India through a tax effort analysis for Own Tax Revenues over the period 2005-06 to 2009-10. Estimates indicate a high tax effort index for the middle and lower income States while the high income States exhibit a low tax effort. Consequently, the scope to augment revenues for the middle and lower income States is limited whereas the high income States enjoy a greater latitude for revenue augmentation particularly in Sales Tax.
Though the term "fiscal space" is recent, the concept has traditionally been at the heart of normative public finance as governments and policy makers have always strived to create additional budgetary room to finance higher levels of expenditure. Several definitions of 'fiscal space' co-exist. Peter Heller (2005) Roy et.al (2009) definitions are that the former tend to focus on the short-term consequences and the potential adverse effect of an increase in public expenditure while the later is concerned with securing long term human development and economic growth and hence seeks to evaluate the effect of concrete policy actions of domestic resource mobilization for pro-poor public investments. The Roy and Heuty conceptualization, thus, focuses on the developmental rather than fiduciary implications of increasing fiscal space (Roy et.al, 2009 ).
Fiscal space diamonds are a diagnostic tool for mapping the government's policy options in securing the necessary fiscal space. Fiscal space is conventionally created through either or a combination of the following policy options: (i) reprioritizing expenditure along with improving the efficiency of public expenditure; (ii) improving domestic revenue mobilization; (iii) securing grants; and (iv) resort to additional borrowing. The more conservative approach, however, would be to create fiscal space within the existing parameters and without resorting to additional borrowing. Alternative approaches to creating fiscal space would be through monetary expansion, through a reduction in the losses of State enterprises, through asset sales and privatization of State enterprises and public-private partnerships which can enlarge the space for investment (Heller, 2005 , Roy et.al, 2009 proper assessment of the returns expected from such projects so as to avoid a burden on their budgets in the future (Reddy, 2002) . Governments have also resorted to publicprivate partnerships to finance infrastructure development. Such public-private partnerships have allowed State governments to access private funds to finance public projects in a non-debt creating manner (Reserve Bank of India, 2008) . In a federal structure, inter-governmental transfers can be crucial for creating space at the State level. have an expansionary impact on total expenditures. We find that fiscal space at the State level is shrinking and can be attributed to the fiscal reforms at the Centre which have resulted in a sharp decline in vertical transfers to States accompanied by financial sector reform which has increased the cost of borrowing of State governments.
III. Methodology
Tax performance for any level of government or across government units at a particular level is usually assessed by the ratio of actual performance to a measure of taxable capacity such as the tax-GSDP ratio. Apart from being a simple indicator of performance, the criticism against a prescriptive ratio such as the tax-GDP ratio is of GDP being an imperfect proxy for the tax base particularly when the tax structure comprises of different taxes each of which may relate to a distinct tax base. Consequently, estimation of tax effort would require the use of better proxies of the tax base and estimation procedures different from the simple prescriptive ratio. The literature takes us to two approaches on the disaggregated estimates of tax effort -the Representative Tax System (RTS) and the multiple regression approach. (Mikesell, 2007) while in the multiple regression approach aggregate tax revenue or individual tax collections are explained by a set of regressors representing the tax base capacity and the difference between the predicted value and the actual value would reflect the 'tax effort' and the consequent ability to create fiscal space.
Given the large data requirement under the RTS, the paper adopts the regression approach to estimate tax effort. We adapt the framework of Sen (1997) and estimate separate regressions for each tax/tax group. The basis for the creation of a tax group, such as the Motor Vehicle Tax, may be attributed to the degree of interchangeability of taxes within the group and the identical proxy of the tax base. Accordingly, tax effort is computed on a disaggregated basis for the following major taxes at the State level. The following equations encapsulate the tax effort analysis for each of the taxes:
The rationale for the choice of regressors is to reflect the appropriate tax base based on theoretical underpinnings and the data availability. Under taxes that can be levied on agriculture, the paper considers land revenue (LR) alone and excludes from its purview agricultural income tax as this tax is levied by just three of the seventeen non-special 
IV. Empirical Evidence
The paper seeks to address the question of space for the seventeen non-special category
States through a tax effort analysis which in turn can help assess the fiscal slack in own 
Figure 1 Own Tax Revenue (OTR) as a percentage of Gross State Domestic Product

Figure 2 Major Taxes as a percentage of Own Tax Revenue 2005-06 to 2009-10
The tax effort analysis for each of the States is computed using the framework outlined in Section III for the period 2005-06 to 2009-10(BE) for the group of seventeen non-special category States and the results are in Table 3 in the log variant with a suffix 'L'. The regressors in equations (1) to (5) The fiscal slack for the disaggregated revenue heads under OTR is computed using a fixed effects model which predicts the tax potential for each State for the different taxes considered and the difference between the predicted value and the actual tax performance would reflect 'fiscal effort' or measure the ability of the State to create fiscal space from the particular tax. The tax effort index measures the actual tax collections against estimates of tax potential and is computed using actual or proxy tax bases which reflect the relationship between the tax bases and tax revenue. The relative tax effort index is computed for each of the disaggregated taxes for the seventeen non-special category States as the ratio of actual tax revenue to the estimated tax potential and equating the average for all 17 States to 1 (Appendix A contains the tax effort for the individual taxes for each of the seventeen non-special category States). The aggregate tax potential for a State is obtained as the sum of the disaggregated potential and the overall tax effort index is obtained as the ratio of aggregate tax revenue to the aggregate tax potential for the each of the seventeen States. Table 4 A major reform in indirect taxes -the dual Goods and Services Tax (GST) which was initially to be introduced in April 2011 but whose implementation has been deferred comprising of a State level Goods and Services Tax (SGST) and the Central level Goods and Services Tax (CGST)) can have substantial implications as it would unify multiple layers of taxation. The GST would be a comprehensive levy on manufacture, sale and consumption of goods and services and will help create a transparent tax administration.
The roadmap aims to move to a single rate goods and services tax (GST) regime of 16 per cent for the Centre as well as the States and the Centre would compensate States for revenue loss incurred on account of the implementation of GST. When introduced this tax would replace VAT (CENVAT), excise duty and service tax at the Centre and VAT at the State level. Further, out of the purview of the SGST are several items such as stamp duties and registration fees, taxes on crude, motor spirit and high speed diesel, alcoholic beverages, purchase tax and so on. The SGST will consequently reduce the flexibility of
States to vary the level of taxes as neither the Centre nor the State can make any unilateral change in the agreed design of GST. However, it is expected that the increase in revenue buoyancy by widening the tax base, lower compliance costs and lower effective tax rates on a wider base can have an impact on the revenue-raising potential of
States. (Rao, 2009 , Reserve Bank of India, 2010 .
